SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON SHOWCASING THE RELATIVE CONVENTIONAL FIGHTING STRENGTHS OF UKRAINE AND RUSSIA USING 2025 DATA.
- Total population: U (Ukraine) 35.6 million…..R (Russia) 140.8 million
- Available manpower: U, 18.2 million……R, 69.0 million
- Fit for service: U, 12.8 million…..R, 46.2 million
- Reaching military age annually: U, 392 thousand…..1.267 million
- Active-duty personnel: U, 900,000…..R, 1,320,000
- Reserve personnel: U, 1.2 million……R, 2 million
- Paramilitary force: U, 100 K……R, 150 K
- Defense Budget: U, $53 billion……R, $126 billion
- Fighter aircraft: U, 70…..R, 833
- Helicopters: U, 136……R, 1,651
- Attack helicopters: U, 39……R, 557
- Tanks: U, 1,114……R, 5,750
- Armored vehicles: U, 18,920…..R, 131,527
- Self-propelled artillery: U, 658……R, 5,168
- Towed artillery: U, 615……R, 8,505
- Mobile rocket projectors: U, 279……R, 3,005
- Naval fleet strength: U, 89……R, 419
OK, it’s a no-brainer, Russia dominates in every category and should win easily.
NOT SO FAST, LET’S BEGIN BY LOOKING AT SOME KEY ELEMENTS OF INVASION-101.
- When planning a mass invasion, it makes sense to position the invading force as quickly as possible just before launching. The element of surprise is a force multiplier. Also, it gives the invaded country less time to prepare a defense. RUSSIA DID NOT DO THIS. For months in the summer and fall of 2021 and early in 2022 the Russian invading force assembled at multiple locations near Ukraine. A pending Russian invasion could not have been more obvious to the world and especially Ukraine.
2. Controlling air space is a force multiplier. By comparing numbers, it looks like a no-brainer for Russia ranked second in the world in aircraft inventory against Ukraine ranked 31. Invasion-101 would suggest that on day-one of the invasion Russia would flood the sky with aircraft to accomplish three things. First, crater the runways at every airbase. Simultaneously take out as much air defense capability as possible. Finally, destroy as many Ukraine aircraft as possible on the ground. Deflate the enemy by taking out their air power immediately. RUSSIA DID NOT DO THIS.
3. Unity of command, a must-have. While the attacking force will take place at differing access points it only makes sense to have a single theater commander to optimize air/ground operations and allocate other resources to most effectively inflict maximum damage on the enemy; create shock and awe. RUSSIA DID NOT DO THIS; They had five co-equal commanders in theater.
4. Prioritize logistics. Two rules. Do not attack until sufficient critical supplies such as ammunition and fuel, are in-theater and properly positioned to support the force. Additionally, be prepared to move supplies forward as rapidly as the attacking force is moving. RUSSIA DID NOT DO THIS. Soon after launching the attack, some elements literally began running out of gas and lost their momentum. It also gave Ukraine force time to adjust and strengthen their defense while the five commanders were arguing over who gets the next supply shipment.
5. Untrained soldiers. The Russian military is not a popular organization and thus has a low percentage of volunteers. It is essentially a conscript force with a large percentage of the force, at any point in time, is in the midst of their one-year of mandatory service. Following basic training and assignment to a unit, many of the soldiers may not have even participated in a unit field training exercise before they are moved into the reserves after one year.
6. Poor leadership at the point of execution. Why? Russia has never invested in, created nor fielded a professional non-commissioned corps; the heart and soul of our military. Their culture has always been and continues to be centralized decision making at a senior level; usually lieutenant colonel and above. The result, a squad leader engaged with the enemy is not authorized to make critical, timely tactical decisions on the ground thereby losing momentum and failing to take advantage of targets of opportunity. They seriously lack unity of effort among the squads, platoons and companies in a combat battalion.
7. Poor morale. Most soldiers do not want to be in the military. One reason is that basic training is noted for its brutal hazing. During the first years following the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, while struggling to put together the Russian armed force, soldiers were actually starving to death, not paid and suffering through winters without adequate housing.
Putin did a special 160,000-man call-up for the Ukraine invasion. In an immediate two-week period, an estimated 370,000 young Russian men fled the country while facing a 10-year prison sentence for purposely avoiding military service.
Soldiers deliberately sabotaging their own vehicles and weapons has and continues to be a serious problem. “The vehicle that is transporting me to the front lines will run out of gas before we get there if there is a small hole in the gas tank”.
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies at least 172,000 Russian soldiers have been killed and 611,000 wounded in the first three years of combat. That’s an average of 715 kia/wia EVERY DAY.
TWO REALITIES HAVE GUIDED THIS WAR
UKRAINE: For about eight years prior to the February 2022 actual invasion, Ukraine had been anticipating Putin’s actions and therefore planning and training precisely how to execute a defense in depth with motivated troops.
RUSSIA: This has not been the General’s war from the beginning of the invasion planning. Many suggest this has been Putin’s war with he and his security group calling the shots.; also known as “amateur hour” resulting in 715 killed or wounded Russian soldiers every day and struck in-place with about 20% of Ukrainian land occupied, not in a few days but in over three years of combat.
BOTTOM LINE
Why can’t Russia win? The Ukranians are fighting for their lives while the Russians along with their North Korean augmentees are not sure why they are fighting and dying. There is an old applicable saying, “It’s not the big armies that win wars, it’s the good one.”