“Win: To achieve victory or finish first”
The Ukraine invasion is more than a month old. According to the “experts” and war gamers, it was to have been “over” weeks ago with the near immediate takedown of the capital city, Kiev. I have enjoyed reading the stories and listening to commentary by the Monday-morning-quarterbacks prognosticating about why Russia isn’t winning. I don’t believe anyone has gotten it right yet. Here is my two cents worth along with some recent history of your U.S. Army.
The generally agreed thesis is that Russia has spent the last few years “modernizing” its forces, concluding, therefore they must be at least “good” or perhaps invincible. Not so fast.
Here is my thesis: Weapons systems, vehicles, aircraft, etc. are tools of the trade for soldiers to kill folks, blowing stuff up and “win” wars while operating from a plan. By the same token hammers, saws, etc. along with an architectural drawing are the basic necessities to build a house. But what if the carpenters, masons, plumbers and electricians are not well trained, motivated or adequately led? The end result will likely be a disaster. You get the picture of where I am going with this argument. It’s all about the people.
Background: 1977-1979 I commanded a nuclear-capable artillery battalion as part of the great 3rd Infantry Division (mechanized). It was the height of the Cold War. We were stationed near the Czechoslovakian border faced off against four Soviet tank divisions. Four to one. But there was never a belief that, if the balloon-went-up, we would be overpowered by their superior numbers of sophisticated “tools.” Why were we so confident?
In simplest terms, there are a couple ways to look at military planning and engagement; one is with a philosophy of maximum centralized planning, maximum centralized control, the Soviet’s solution. Contrast that with the U.S. Army belief in a concept of maximum centralized planning, maximum DEcentralized execution. Decentralized execution works but you cannot just say it and forget it; you have to proactively make it possible for that concept to be successful.
I recall our intelligence and study of the Soviet forces told us that officers, noncommissioned officers and soldiers below the rank of lieutenant colonel were completely out of the picture when it came to decision-making on the battlefield. There is nothing that can hamstring an operating force, at the point of execution, more than a mother-may-I requirement before moving forward or engaging the opposing force.
A corollary to the concept of max centralized planning and control is that the Russians were then, and obviously still are, all about mass. The operational concept is for overwhelming numbers of armored vehicles, soldiers, fire support and air superiority to just roll over their enemy, irrespective of collateral damage or casualties on both sides.
Now let’s get to the bottom line. The reason why the Soviets felt they had to operate via centralized control was because they did not have a professional noncommissioned officer corp. That is, highly trained Sergeants leading squads, Sergeants as second in command at the platoon level, company First Sergeants, battalion Command Sergeants Major and more senior Command Sergeants Major assisting and advising their commanders at the brigade, division and corps levels. We had that, a very professional noncommissioned officer chain of leadership, we believed in that type of organization and we were confident no one could beat us, no matter how many tanks they had.
As we watch the Russian Ukrainian invasion, almost in real time, some of the video demonstrates their lack of small unit decision-making at the point of execution. For example, we have seen a tank column moving down a highway with their perfect 50-foot intervals moving towards an obvious potential ambush site as if they were in a parade.
By contrast, a U.S. tank company commander would have been given the mission to move his unit from point A to B, today. He would use imagery to do a pre-reconnaissance of all the terrain between A and B. He would have access to direct-support field artillery to conduct recon-by-fire (i.e., blow up) potential ambush sites that could not be otherwise avoided, he would spread the formation giving each tank sergeant the option to assess terrain and make decisions about how to work his lane. Tanks would team up to leap-frog each other with one tank always on overwatch as the tank company moved forward. It’s not rocket science, it’s maximum decentralized execution on the ground in real time at the pointy end of the spear.
Well, you say, that doesn’t sound difficult, why don’t the Russians do that? Good question. My answer is, it is all about the culture of the organization. Culture is a powerful and pervasive force in every organization. The Russian government, socialism, communism is all about control of everything. That culture seeps down into and consumes everything below the centralized control government. For the military to be able to operate any other way is not easy and perhaps impossible. Culture, a powerful and pervasive force.
Our way of operating is not a new concept. During our revolution, General Washington painted the big picture and then, by necessity, turned the tactics, techniques and procedures over to subordinate commanders to make it happen. A culture of decentralized execution was born out of necessity to defeat the larger better equipped British force. Decentralized execution has been a base-line philosophy as American ingenuity and innovation in every aspect of life led us to become a respected world leader.
I don’t want to leave you with the impression that we were the best we could be standing toe-to-toe with the Soviets in 1977; far from it. We were still slightly hungover from having unfinished business in Vietnam, going through growing pains with an all-volunteer military and recreational drug use was rampant in the 1970’s which leaked into the military to an unacceptable level. Also, there was an air of disrespect left over from Viet Nam towards military leaders in particular and throughout society in general.
The take-away from this article is the differences between your U.S. Army and the Russian Ukrainian invasion force. To do that I am going to give you a tutorial about how we transitioned from an OK force to a great one and why it took a generation to get there. To some of you the next few paragraphs may be a little boring but it is your Army filled with your sons and daughters so I urge you to read on.
In the mid 1980’s three brilliant forward-looking Army generals, Max Thurman, Colon Powell and Carl Vuono (my boss for three consecutive assignments as a colonel) decided the Army needed a re-look and if necessary, a re-do of organization, training and culture.
I led a 12-person team to redesign and reorganize the force where necessary; every tactical element of the combat, combat support, and combat service organizations. All of that lead to a force that was more agile, more deployable with instant and continuous interaction among direct combat units (e.g. infantry, armor) combat support (e.g. field artillery, air defense, combat engineers, air elements, intelligence) and all service support, all logistical elements and medical.
Simultaneously we initiated a complete overhaul of training doctrine; more specifically how to get every single uniformed person involved in a culture of accountability. The formula was task-condition-standard; that is, identify every task to be performed work them against varying conditions and create a standard for every task recognizing that an organization without standards is a failed organization.
COMMON TASKS: Every soldier had to be, at all times, proficient in common tasks to a prescribed standard of excellence; for example, individual weapons proficiency, how to function in a chemical environment, escape and evasion, land navigation and physical fitness. No one got a “C”, it was pass-or-fail and failure was unacceptable and had to be rectified quickly.
SPECIFIED TASKS: There are 190 MOS, military occupational specialties in the totality of the Army; infantry, field artillery, aviation mechanic, medic, intel specialist, etc. etc. So, the Army published a task list for every MOS. Every person had to be trained to standard for every task under every condition (e.g., night ops vs daylight). In training it is not a matter of once and done; for many of the tasks, proficiency is perishable and training time must be allocated to refresh tasks to be able to consistently meet standards; the simplest example is physical training, which is scheduled five days a week.
Common task training begins when a soldier enters basic training. Following that, each soldier is given an MOS and sent off to receive training in their specified task list followed by assignment to a unit where they gain experience and expertise training every day with their peers under the tutelage of a squad leader.
Here is the linkage between training and culture. A culture of individual accountability grows out of this training concept of task-condition-standard. Every soldier accepts that they are accountable for sustained proficiency in their MOS.
COLLECTIVE TASKS: That’s the basics of common and specified tasks. Now all of this has to fit together to form a cohesive highly trained unit. Enter collective tasks; the transition from individual accountability to leader accountability. Every leader, Staff Sergeant, E-6 squad leader through corps commander is held accountable for the performance of his/her command element. The collective task list naturally gets more extensive and complex moving up through the chain of command to platoon, company, battalion, brigade, division, corps, Army levels of command.
This begs the question, how do leaders (officers and sergeants) become proficient in their collective tasks? Short answer, schooling followed by unit assignments. Every 2nd lieutenant begins their career in a six-week basic course studying specified and collective tasks before going off to their first unit assignment. Those officers who choose to remain on active duty go back to school for nine months of advanced study before taking command of a company. Battalion commanders will all have attended a one-year course studying combat at the operational level. Brigade commanders will have attended the one-year long Army War College studying warfare at the strategic and combined level. All of this in-house training is followed by command and staff positions commensurate with that training level.
The Army has similar stepping-stone schools for the noncommissioned officers, Staff Sergeants E-6 through Sergeant Major, E-9.
The Army is a results-oriented organization. The objective of all the school-house time and unit training described above is to end up with the following:
One: A deeply rooted, institutionalized culture of accountability, trust and respect; a formula for success in any organization military or civilian. Accountability and respect grow out of the training regime described above.
Creating a culture of trust began on day-one of basic training. Recruits are a product of America; they arrive at boot camp with biases based on their upbringing, education, talent, physical prowess, etc. where drill sergeants begin the indoctrination process. Every recruit has the same hair style, short, and will all dress the same; there is a reason it is called a “uniform”. Day two, they begin to understand their Army life will revolve around two concepts. One is the mission and secondly, above all else, you are responsible for the person on your right and left. Soon it begins to sink in that if I am responsible for those on my right and left, that means that they are also responsible for me. Soldiers begin to understand, “someone always has my back, I’m not alone, this is my team and I trust them” Trust, a powerful cultural force.
Two: Every person and every unit is trained to a consistent high standard.
Three: Every person understands the Army is a meritocracy-driven organization where you can be all you can be. Not everyone will achieve the same results. Creating an environment of equality of opportunity allows the cream-of-the-crop to rise to the top and be recognized.
Four: Your Army is the most and best integrated organization in the world. On 26 July, 1948, President Truman issued Executive Order 9981, which declared “There shall be equality of treatment and opportunity for all persons in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.” That was the end of racial segregation in the military. Is it perfect, of course not, nothing is; but every day the organization strives to be as good as it can possibly be.
Five: Ferocity with morality. Indoctrination is not a dirty word if used properly and that is exactly what happens with every soldier. How else are we to take volunteers from across the spectrum of America and convince them it is OK to kill the enemy and blow things up? Having done that, a high moral coefficient is to be applied to every combat action by every soldier regardless of rank. For example, U.S. Army planning, from the squad leader to Unified Command levels, will always include an assessment of the risk associated with two factors; the potential for civilian casualties and/or unacceptable collateral damage. If either exist, the planning process moves on to plan B.
As previously pointed out, this refinement of how the Army trains and operates began in the mid 1980’s. In August of 1990 Iraq’s brutal dictator, Saddam Hussein, invaded its southern neighbor, Kuwait, with the “mother of all armies” Republican Guard armored divisions in what became known as the First Gulf War. Saddam Hussein’s objectives were to cancel a debt of US$14 billion with Kuwait and to control their oil production. Additionally, it was believed the invasion was the first step towards Middle East hegemony with invasion of Saudi Arabia next on the list.
On 24 February, 1991, a U.S. led coalition, Operation Desert Storm, began a massive offensive against Iraq’s Republican Guard armored divisions. They were rapidly overwhelmed and after just two days of fighting Iraq’s Army folded, with 10,000 of its troop’s prisoners and most of its equipment destroyed.
A long-time friend, who commanded a U.S. division in Desert Storm, later told me, “It didn’t take us two days to defeat Iraq, it took a generation.” His point, the Army of Excellence training and culture shift from 1985-1990 had culminated in perhaps the best trained, best equipped and best led military force ever fielded on a battlefield.
Back to the question, why is Russia not winning? An Army cannot be all is can/should be while operating with unyielding centralized control, without a professional noncommissioned officer corps and without a morality code of conduct. When it becomes obvious to the casual observer that killing women and children and specifically targeting where they reside has become a key objective of a military operation, one cannot expect that organization to “win”.
Accountability, trust, respect, high standards, meritocracy driven, morality; do we detect any of those attributes in the Russian forces we see on TV every day? I believe the answer to the lead question, WHY RUSSIA ISN’T WINNING has become obvious. Russia my ultimately “succeed” in securing some or all Ukrainian territory, but they will never “win.”
Marvin L. Covault, Lt Gen US Army, retired, is the author of VISION TO EXECUTION, a book for leaders, a columnist for THE PILOT, a national award-winning local newspaper in Southern Pines, NC and the author of a blog, WeThePeopleSpeaking.com.